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Clausal structures may represent either energetic or absolute interactions (c.f. 
e.g. Langacker 1999: 28). In the former, which involve a transfer of energy from 
one object to another through physical contact, a prototypical subject constitutes 
an active agent volitionally exerting force on the other entity. The causer of an 
event should be considered responsible for and in control of the action, with 
responsibility and control constituting important agentive properties (Nishimura 
1993: 519).  
 
Absolute interactions, on the other hand, involve processes without any 
reference to causation or a transmission of energy from another participant. 
Mental experience, whether perceptual, emotive, or intellectual, is a case in 
point here, where prototypically an experiencer is said to be engaged in the 
process. “The experiencer (…) resembles the agent to the extent that his 
involvement in the action is volitional nd he has control over the execution of 
the mental process” (Dąbrowska 1997: 94). Thus, again the performer of the 
process appears rather “active than passive, conscious rather than lacking 
consciousness, rational rather than irrational, [and] capable of referring to the 
objective world and seeing things that are really ‘out there’” (Dąbrowska 1997: 
97). As the only active participant, he thus may be considered to take the 
initiative in a non-energetic mental path extending to the object (Langacker 
1999: 31). Schlesinger (1998: 30-38) also treats the subject who initiates the 
mental process not only as being in control of but also responsible for what he or 
she thinks. 
 
If, as indicated above, features such as active participation, volition, control 
and responsibility are present in both types of perormers, the question arises 
whether the distinction between agents and experiencers should be made, and 
whether it is not simply a matter of terminology or perhaps the presence of 
force, or lack thereof, that makes the interactions, and hence subject roles, 
different. It should not go unnoticed that some mental experience resembles an 
2  Iwona Kokorniak and Barbara Konat 
 
action or activity more than a state, as it is usually reckoned, and some types of 
participants are more active, volitional, responsible for or in control of the 
process than others. Thus, one needs to consider whther all participants 
involved in mental experience should be ascribed equal status, i.e. that of an 
experiencer. We shall investigate whether such a cle r-cut distinction between 
agents and experiencers should be made, or whether “Ag nt and Experiencer are 
not two clearly delimited notional categories; [and] rather, there seems to be a 
gradient” (Schlesinger 1998: 21), which suggests the existence of an agent-
experiencer continuum. Thus, one might claim that some experiencers are at 
least quasi-agentive. 
 
In the paper, we focus on the verb myśleć ‘think’ in Polish and attempt to 
find out whether there is any correspondence between th  semantic features of 
the subject and verb grammatical constructions. Firt, senses of the verb will be 
identified, and then their subjects will be assigned the four agentive features. 
Next, on the basis of corpus data the actual patterns of sense use will be 
searched for by means of an exploratory tool, i.e. Multiple Correspondence 
Analysis. The tool should help us to see the correlation between the senses and 
the features. Positive results of our study would confirm the general cognitive 




2. Sense distinction of myśleć ‘think’ in Polish 
 
The English verb think, construing general mental activity unavailable to 
external observation “potentially divorced from all outer manifestation” 
(Fortescue 2001: 16), is highly polysemous. By providing synonyms, Fortescue 
(2001: 28) divides the sphere of this conscious human process into ‘to think = to 
believe’, ‘to think = to consider/judge’, ‘to think = to perform 
unspecified/general mental activity which involves ‘mulling over’ some mental 
content, and finally ‘to think = to intend”. 
  
Słownik Poprawnej Polszczyzny (‘The Dictionary of Proper Polish’, 
henceforth SPP, 2005) also provides synonymous terms for the Polish 
equivalent of think, i.e. myśleć which can be translated as ‘to find relationships 
between/among things (to meditate, cogitate, understand, judge, consider, think 
deeply’, ’to remember, care about something/somebody’ and ‘to intend to do 
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something’. As can be seen, within the first sense, many distinct synonyms have 
been provided, which points at a complex nature of the process. 
 
Pawłowska (1981: 149-160) identifies one general sense of myśleć, i.e. ‘to 
create linguistic texts in one’s mind which are only available to its creator’, and 
three narrower senses, namely ‘to cogitate, ponder’, ‘to consider’ and ‘to 
intend’, the second being expressed by the phrase myśleć, że ‘think that’ 
extensively discussed by Danielewiczowa (2002). 
  
In the attempt to find out whether the primary participant of the mental 
activity of thinking represented by the verb myśleć ‘think’ in Polish, is more 
agent- or experiencer-like, we have decided to relyon the aforementioned 
sources, although reference to other, yet also rathe  intuitive, definitions could 
be made, As presented in Table 1, five different seses have been distinguished 
for the analysis, i.e. (i) to remember, (ii) to find relationships between/among 
things, (iii) to believe in the truth of a proposition, (iv) to intend to do 
something, and (v) to deliberate, to consider, to think deeply, each representing a 
different number of features for the subject role. As can be observed, senses (ii) 
and (v) derive from one sense provided by SPP, the distinction being accounted 
for later in this section. Each sense, together with the features that it has been 
ascribed, will be discussed below. 
 
Table 1: Sense distinctions of myśleć ‘think’ in Polish and the semantic features of the 
Subject 
 
Sense Active Volitional Controlling Responsible 
i) to remember - - - - 
ii) to find relationships 
between/among things  
+ - - - 
iii) to believe in the 
truth of a proposition 
+ + - - 
iv) to intend to do 
something 
+ + + - 
v) to deliberate, to 
consider, to think 
deeply  
+ + + + 
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In the first sense, i.e. ‘to remember’, the subject is non-active, non-
volitional, non-responsible and has no control over the process, which means 
that the subject represents a passive experiencer. Although at a first glance it 
may look as if memory were something under subject’s ontrol, rather than 
being passively experienced, psychological findings indicate otherwise. 
Referring to other psychological sources, Schacter (2002) has described 
common failures of memory and called them ‘sins of memory’. As he points 
out, because of the ‘sin of transience’, for example, people forget important 
information, even if they have put a lot of effort in memorizing it. The ‘sin of 
absent-mindedness’, very common for most of us, makes us forget where we left 
our car keys or glasses.  Also, our prospective memory, namely remembering to 
do things, can fail. Other ‘sins’ described by Schacter (2002) include the ‘sin of 
blocking’, the ‘sin of misattribution’, the ‘sin of suggestibility’, the ‘sin of bias’, 
and the ‘sin of persistence’. The aforementioned sins make the mind take a 
passive stance, with the memory being rather experienced than performed. Let 
us consider example (1). In the English translation, ‘to remember’ appears to be 
a perfect equivalent of myśleć: 
 
(1)   O ochronie letniskowego domu przed grzybami i owadami trzeba myśleć 
już wtedy, gdy przystępujemy do jego budowy. 
‘One should remember to protect the summer house from ungi and insects  
when the house is being constructed.’ 
 
In this sense, myśleć ‘think’ tends to co-occur with the preposition o ‘about’ 
followed by a nominal phrase in the locative case. 
 
Senses (ii) and (v) both constitute kinds of cognitive activity, with 
cognition understood here as ”the mental activities involved in acquiring and 
processing information” (Colman 2001). However, in this study, acquiring 
information has been separated from the voluntary processing of information, 
with the former constituting sense (ii) and the latter sense (v).  
 
Remembering, experiencing sensations and expecting a  take the same 
object. However, as a result of these processes the same object can take a 
number of forms, or in other words it can constitute ‘modified content of the 
same genera’ (Husserl 2005). Thus, relying on Husserl’  ideas, we have 
considered senses (ii) and (v) of myśleć as grasping different aspects of mental 
activity. Sense (ii) denotes ‘finding relationships between or among things’. 
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Quite frequently, it is an ongoing process with the subject actively participating 
in it, as in example (2a): 
 
(2)a. Nowy dzień… - myślał. - Jeszcze jeden nowy dzień… 
‘A new day… – he thought/was thinking – another new day… 
 
Both externality of the cause and the presence of the object, play an important 
role in Husserl’s distinctions of types of mental activity. As he points out, “[w]e 
have experience of concrete physical things in external perception, but no longer 
in memory or in forward-regarding expectation” (Husserl 1983: 6). In sense (ii), 
the cause of the mental activity is often external, so the subject is unable to stop 
the process, even if they want to. Thus, the process is not volitional and the 
subject exhibits no control of or responsibility for the process, which is 
connected to Husserl’s understanding of experience (or sensation). Consider 
example (2b): 
 
(2)b. Widząc postawnego bohatera  "Spartakusa" trudno nie myśleć o 
przemijaniu, o okrucieństwie czasu. 
‘Seeing the handsome protagonist of ‘Spartacus’, it was hard not to think 
about the cruel passing time.’ 
 
Just like sense (ii), sense (v) is also related to cognition. However, 
cognition is viewed here from a different angle. The subject is the causer of the 
process, and he or she can induce or stop it, regardless of external factors. The 
subject volitionally takes up the mental activity, and hence is in control of and 
bears full responsibility for the process, which relat s to Husserl’s distinction 
between natural cognition (sense (ii)) and something “beyond the narrow bounds 
of direct experiential givenness” (Husserl 1983: 6), such as for instance 
empathy, history or the humanities (Husserl 1983). Prototypical for sense (v) are 
thus philosophical deliberations, as in example (3a) as well as so called folk (or 
natural) philosophical thinking, as in example (3b): 
 
(3)a. Ontologia, królowa filozoficznych dyscyplin. W "myślę, więc jestem"  
Kartezjusz nie dotarł (…). 
‘Onthology, the queen of philosophical disciplines. In ‘I think, therefore I 
am’ Descartes did not reach… 
b.    Nigdy nie powtórzy się to wieszanie prania - myślała. –  
Nigdy nie powtórzę się ja. 
‘Spreading of the washing will never recur – she thought.  
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I will never recur.’ 
 
Since the subject is in control and takes responsibility for the mental 
activity, we have made an assumption, which will be tested statistically, that 
myśleć in this sense will co-occur with a nominal object in the instrumental case 
preceded by nad, as in (4a) and (4b): 
 
(4)a. Myślał  nad ścisłym, rozumowym wyjaśnieniem tego zjawiska. 
‘He pondered over a logical and precise explanation of this phenomenon.’ 
b.     Nigdy nie myślał nad tym, żeby przestać palić. 
‘He (has) never thought of quitting smoking.’ 
 
In sense (iii), i.e. ‘believing in the truth of a pro osition’, the philosophical 
understanding of a proposition has been adopted, with the proposition being 
either true or false. In linguistics, “[b]y proposition one usually understands the 
language-independent common denominator of the meaning of sentences which 
express the factuality of a given state of affairs” (Bussmann 1996). Thus, it can 
be assumed that propositions are represented with clausal complements which 
are preceded by myśleć, że ‘think that’. We have observed that subjects of such 
sentences are construed as active and volitional as they are fully aware of their 
opinions or judgments; however, it is hard to talk bout their possessing any 
control over or bearing any responsibility for the content of the proposition. The 
lack of control over the external factors is frequently expressed by the second or 
third person in the subject position of the clausal complement, as in (5a) and 
(5b), respectively: 
 
(5)a. A myśmy myśleli, że pan się zakochał. 
‘And we thought that you have fallen in love.’ 
b.    Myślę, że to będzie bardzo dobre. 
‘I think that it will be very good.’ 
 
Finally, in sense (iv) the subject’s mental activity takes place of his or her 
own will, as a result of which they are capable of manipulating some abstract 
categories, which however are usually unavailable to the interested party. 
Nonetheless, the subject is ready to take some action to attain the intended aim, 
or to stop considering taking it up, and thus the mental process is controlled. No 
responsibility can be ascribed to the subject as he or she is considering to start 
actions commencing in the future. The action intended to be taken up by the 
participant can be reflected with a number of constructions, namely with a 
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deverbal nominal phrase followed by o ‘about’ in the locative case, as in (6a), a 
clause, as in (6b), or an infinitival phrase, as in (6c): 
 
(6)a. Ostatnio myślał o rezygnacji z piłkarskiej kariery. 
‘He recently was thinking about giving up his football career.’ 
b.     Myślałem, że się wybiorę dzisiaj do ciebie 
‘I thought that I would visit you today.’ 
c.     Nie myśleli zmarnować państwowych pieniędzy. 
‘They didn’t intend to waste state revenue.’ 
 
Summing up, the lexical senses of the verb myśleć ‘think’ in Polish 
constitute a scale, where a subject moves from an experiencer- to agent-like 







Figure 1: The experiencer-agent continuum. 
 
The number of features that the participant possesse  increases as the 
process resembles more a deliberate mental activity rather than a state. Most of 
the senses can be ascribed construction patterns, which has been shown in the 
examples above.  
 
 
3. A corpus-based analysis of the senses of myśleć 
 
Now that the senses of the verb myśleć ‘think’ have been identified, each being 
ascribed a number of agentive features, what we are left with is to determine 
whether correlations between the subject semantic features and the senses exist. 
For this purpose, a corpus-based analysis has been conducted. For the corpus 
sample to be large and representative enough of various types of language and 
register, the PWN Corpus of Polish, constituting a part of the Polish National 
Corpus, has been used. Its full version consists of 40 million words sampled 
from 386 books, 977 issues of 185 newspapers and magazines, 84 recorded (and 
transcribed) conversations, 207 websites as well as several hundred leaflets. It is 
balanced both in terms of genre and topic distribution. From the demo online 
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version of the corpus containing 7.5 million words, we have randomly selected 
nearly one thousand sentences with myśleć ‘think’ in considerable context.  
 
Every occurrence of myśleć was analysed and annotated for a number of 
formal and semantic properties, the focus being on the verb’s argument 
structure, in which, as Divjak (2006) notes, “the main participants of events or 
situations are encoded”. Thus, formally verb’s comple ents were marked for 
clausal structure (ObjCaseNA/Clause), infinitival form (ObjCaseNA/INF) or 
nominal case (o+LOC, nad+INSTR, ACC, o+LOC/Clause, 
nad+INSTR/Clause),1 whereas in semantic terms subject forms were annotted 
for features such as activity (SubjAC vs. SubjNA), volitionality (SubjV vs. 
SubjNV), control (SubjC vs. SubjNC) and responsibility (SubjR vs. SubjNR).2 
 
A careful analysis of all the annotated features allowed us to apply the 
multiple correspondence analysis, in order to look at the visualisation of the 
correspondences between the subject semantic features and verb constructions 
representing the senses distinguished in Section 2. The correspondences are 
represented in a plot by means of relative distances (e.g. Glynn 2009).  
 
The plot in Figure 2 shows three main associations of features. The upper 
right-hand corner grouping represents the verb clausal complement 
(ObjCaseNA/Clause) corresponding with an active (SubjAC) and a volitional 
subject (SubjV), which refers to sense (iii). The upper left-hand corner, on the 
other hand, presents a correlation between the nad+INSTR and 
nad+INSTR/Clause constructions and a controlling (SubjC) and responsible 
(SubjR) subject of sense (v). Finally, the cluster in the middle in the upper part 
of the plot associates infinitival constructions with active and controlling but 
non-responsible subjects of sense (iv).  
The bottom right-hand corner portrays the lack of activity (SubjNA) and 
volition (SubjNV), constituting subject semantic features in sense (i), as being 
rather distant from the centrally located o+LOC and o+LOC/Clause 
constructions. The least transparent is the correlation representing sense (ii), 
                                                
1 In some sentences, the preposition was followed by both a case marked pronoun and a 
clause yet.’; there(e,g, o+LOC/Clause), as in Myślę o tym, co jeszcze zrobię. ‘ I am thinking 
about what I will do were also occurrences of myśleć not followed by any complementation 
(ObjCaseNA/ObjFormNA, as in Myślę całym sobą. ‘I am thinking with my whole body.’). 
2 The lack of each feature has been provided as the econd one in the parentheses. 
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since the lack of volition, control and responsibility as well as active 
participation come close to many constructions.  
Such results suggest that active, volitional, controlling and responsible 
agents involved in the mental activity are more preval nt and prominent than 
passive and non-volitional experiencers who are hardly responsible for and in 
control of the mental state. The results also indirectly support the general 
cognitive assumption that syntactic structures are m aningful, rather than 
arbitrary and unpredictable as some correlations between semantic features of 
the subject role and grammatical constructions have been identified.  
In order to see whether the correlations between th two variables are 
statistically significant, some confirmatory techniques, such as Logistic 
Regression Analysis, should be used. However, in our data the occurrence of 
some construction patterns was too low for the analysis to be carried out. This 
means that the next study should be carried out on a larger sample where a 









In cognitive linguistics, so far a clear distinction has been made between agents 
and experiencers, the former referring to subject roles in energetic and the latter 
in absolute interactions. However, most linguists have assigned the same 
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features, such as activity, volition, control and responsibility to both types of 
performers.  
 
Focusing only on one mental verb myśleć ‘think’ in Polish, we have 
identified five senses of the verb and tried to ascribe the four features to the 
participants in particular processes depicted by the verb senses. The sense 
selection was based on linguistic, psychological and philosophical sources, and 
then verified by a corpus-based statistical analysis.  
 
The multiple correspondence analysis, by means of which we have tried to 
explore the correlation between the subject semantic features and verb 
complement structures representing particular sense has confirmed the 
existence of three senses, i.e.  sense (iii), repres nt d by myśleć, że ‘think that’; 
sense (iv), represented by myśleć + verb infinitive; and finally sense (v), 
represented by myśleć nad followed by a nominal phrase in the instrumental 
case, which in turn may be followed by an infinitival phrase. The subject of each 
sense denotes a participant whose involvement in the mental experience 
increases as the process resembles more an activity than a state. The prevalence 
of the former has been noted, and thus a tentative obs rvation can be made that 
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